Isaam Sadak

Manhattan, New York
(Morocco)

Prudent Juries

Legal texts pertaining to detention and deportation, ranging from the US Constitution to the Immigration Act of 2004, which formed the basis for the lightbox installation Prudent Juries.

View Prudent Juries

Korematsu v. United States

Supreme Court (S Ct.), 323 U.S. 214, 219-220, 244-46 (1944).

Black: "We uphold the exclusion order as of the time it was made and when the petitioner violated it. Cf. Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547, 44 S.Ct. 405, 406, 68 L.Ed. 841; Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154, 155, 41 S.Ct. 458, 459, 65 L.Ed. 865, 16 A.L.R. 165. In doing so, we are not unmindful of the hardships imposed by it upon a large group of American citizens. Cf. Ex parte Kumezo Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 73, 63 S.Ct. 115, 117, 87 L.Ed. 58. But hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships."

Justice Jackson (Dissent): Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army program for deporting and detaining these citizens of Japanese extraction. But a judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself. A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military emergency. Even during that period a succeeding commander may revoke it all. But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens.

Read Full Text (off-site in new window) | Back to Top

Ex parte Endo

S Ct., 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944)

"We are of the view that Mitsuye Endo should be given her liberty. In reaching that conclusion we do not come to the underlying constitutional issues which have been argued. For we conclude that, whatever power the War Relocation Authority may have to detain other classes of citizens, it has no authority to subject citizens who are concededly loyal to its leave procedure."

Read Full Text (off-site in new window) | Back to Top

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld

124 S.Ct. 2633, 2646 -2649 (2004)

"Moreover, as critical as the Government's interest may be in detaining those who actually pose an immediate threat to the national security of the United States during ongoing international conflict, history and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat. See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall., at 125 ("[The Founders] knew-- the history of the world told them--the nation they were founding, be its existence short or long, would be involved in war; how often or how long continued, human foresight could not tell; and that unlimited power, wherever lodged at such a time, was especially hazardous to freemen"). Because we live in a society in which "[m]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty," O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975), our starting point for the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis is unaltered by the allegations surrounding the particular detainee or the organizations with which he is alleged to have associated. We reaffirm today the fundamental nature of a citizen's right to be free from involuntary confinement by his own government without due process of law, and we weigh the opposing governmental interests against the curtailment of liberty that such confinement entails."

Read Full Text (off-site in new window) | Back to Top

Rumsfeld v. Padilla

124 S.Ct. 2711, 2735 (2004) (Justice Stevens, J., dissenting)

"Executive detention of subversive citizens, like detention of enemy soldiers to keep them off the battlefield, may sometimes be justified to prevent persons from launching or becoming missiles of destruction. It may not, however, be justified by the naked interest in using unlawful procedures to extract information. Incommunicado detention for months on end is such a procedure. Whether the information so procured is more or less reliable than that acquired by more extreme forms of torture is of no consequence. For if this Nation is to remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the tools of tyrants even to resist an assault by the forces of tyranny."

Read Full Text (off-site in new window) | Back to Top

Rasul v. Bush

124 S.Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004)

"Petitioners contend that they are being held in federal custody in violation of the laws of the United States. [FN15] No party questions the District Court's jurisdiction over petitioners' custodians. Cf. Braden, 410 U.S., at 495, 93 S.Ct. 1123. Section 2241, by its terms, requires nothing more. We therefore hold that § 2241 confers on the District Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.

"FN15. Petitioners' allegations--that, although they have engaged neither in combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in Executive detention for more than two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing--unquestionably describe "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277- 278, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990) (KENNEDY, J., concurring), and cases cited therein."

Read Full Text (off-site in new window) | Back to Top

USA PATRIOT Act

(c) REPORTS- Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Attorney General shall submit a report to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, with respect to the reporting period, on--

(1) the number of aliens certified under section 236A(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by subsection (a);

(2) the grounds for such certifications;

(3) the nationalities of the aliens so certified;

(4) the length of the detention for each alien so certified; and

(5) the number of aliens so certified who--

(A) were granted any form of relief from removal;

(B) were removed;

(C) the Attorney General has determined are no longer aliens who may be so certified; or

(D) were released from detention.

Read Full Text (off-site in new window) | Back to Top

Immigration Act

8 U.S.C.A. § 1227 (2005)

(a) Classes of deportable aliens

(1) Inadmissible at time of entry or of adjustment of status or violates status

(C) Violated nonimmigrant status or condition of entry

(i) Nonimmigrant status violators

Any alien who was admitted as a nonimmigrant and who has failed to maintain the nonimmigrant status in which the alien was admitted or to which it was changed under section 1258 of this title, or to comply with the conditions of any such status, is deportable.

(ii) Violators of conditions of entry

Any alien whom the Secretary of Health and Human Services certifies has failed to comply with terms, conditions, and controls that were imposed under section 1182(g) of this title is deportable.

(3) Failure to register and falsification of documents

(A) Change of address

An alien who has failed to comply with the provisions of section 1305 of this title is deportable, unless the alien establishes to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that such failure was reasonably excusable or was not willful.

Read Full Text (off-site in new window) | Back to Top

The Material Witness Statute

18 U.S.C.A. § 3144 (2005)

"If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person and treat the person in accordance with the provisions of section 3142 of this title. No material witness may be detained because of inability to comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Release of a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."

Read Full Text (off-site in new window) | Back to Top

The Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1

March 21, 2002, Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense

B. Duties of the Commission During Trial

(3) Hold open proceedings except where otherwise decided by the Appointing Authority or the Presiding Officer in accordance with the President's Military Order and this Order. Grounds for closure include the protection of information classified or classifiable under reference (d); information protected by law or rule from unauthorized disclosure; the physical safety of participants in Commission proceedings, including prospective witnesses; intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, or activities; and other national security interests. The Presiding Officer may decide to close all or part of a proceeding on the Presiding Officer's own initiative or based upon a presentation, including an ex parte, in camera presentation by either the Prosecution or the Defense. A decision to close a proceeding or portion thereof may include a decision to exclude the Accused, Civilian Defense Counsel, or any other person, but Detailed Defense Counsel may not be excluded from any trial proceeding or portion thereof. Except with the prior authorization of the Presiding Officer and subject to Section 9, Defense Counsel may not disclose any information presented during a closed session to individuals excluded from such proceeding or part thereof. Open proceedings may include, at the discretion of the Appointing Authority, attendance by the public and accredited press, and public release of transcripts at the appropriate time. Proceedings should be open to the maximum extent practicable. Photography, video, or audio broadcasting, or recording of or at Commission proceedings shall be prohibited, except photography, video, and audio recording by the Commission pursuant to the direction of the Presiding Officer as necessary for preservation of the record of trial.

Read Full Text (off-site in new window) | Back to Top

US Constitution — Fifth Amendment

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Read Full Text (off-site in new window) | Back to Top

US Constitution — Fourteenth Amendment, Clause 1

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Read Full Text (off-site in new window) | Back to Top

US Department of Justice Memorandum

from Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales August 1, 2002

Footnote 3: If convicted of torture, a defendant faces a fine or up to twenty years' imprisonment or both.  If, however, the act resulted in the victim's death, a defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment or to death.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340(a).  Whether death results from the act also affects the applicable statute of limitations.  Where death does not result, the statute of limitations is eight years; if death results, there is no statute of limitations.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3286(b) (West Supp. 2002); id. § 2332b)g)(5)(B) (West Supp. 2002).  Section 2340 as originally enacted did not provide for the death penalty as a punishment.  See Omnibus Crime Bill, Pub. I. No. 103-322. Title VI, Section 60020, 108 Stat. 1979 (1994) (amending section 2340A to provide for the death penalty); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-711, at 388 (1994) (noting that the act added the death penalty as a penalty for torture).

...

Despite the apparent differences in language between the Convention and § 2340, international law clearly could not hold the United States to an obligation different than that expressed in § 2340.  When it acceded to the Convention, the United States attached to its instrument of ratification a clear understanding that defined torture in the exact terms used by § 2340.  The first Bush administration submitted the following understanding of the treaty:

The United States understands that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental pain caused by or resulting from (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) administration or application, or threatened administration or application, or mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will imminently be subject to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application or mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.

Read Full Text (off-site in new window) | Back to Top

Clark v. Suarez Martinez

125 S.Ct. 716, 727 (2005)

The Government fears that the security of our borders will be compromised if it must release into the country inadmissible aliens who cannot be removed. If that is so, Congress can attend to it. [FN8]

"FN8. That Congress has the capacity to do so is demonstrated by its reaction to our decision in Zadvydas. Less than four months after the release of our opinion, Congress enacted a statute which expressly authorized continued detention, for a period of six months beyond the removal period (and renewable indefinitely), of any alien (1) whose removal is not reasonably foreseeable and (2) who presents a national security threat or has been involved in terrorist activities. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT), § 412(a), 115 Stat. 350 (enacted Oct. 26, 2001) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(6) (2000 ed., Supp. II))."

Read Full Text (off-site in new window) | Back to Top

Zadvydas v. Davis

533 U.S. 678, 701-2 (2001)

In order to limit *701 the occasions when courts will need to make them, we think it practically necessary to recognize some presumptively reasonable period of detention. We have adopted similar presumptions in other contexts to guide lower court determinations. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379-380, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 16 L.Ed.2d 629 (1966) (plurality opinion) (adopting rule, based on definition of "petty offense" in United States Code, that right to jury trial extends to all cases in which sentence of six months or greater is imposed); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-58, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991) (O'CONNOR, J.) (adopting presumption, **2505 based on lower court estimate of time needed to process arrestee, that 48-hour delay in probable- cause hearing after arrest is reasonable, hence constitutionally permissible).

"While an argument can be made for confining any presumption to 90 days, we doubt that when Congress shortened the removal period to 90 days in 1996 it believed that all reasonably foreseeable removals could be accomplished in that time. We do have reason to believe, however, that Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months. See Juris. Statement in United States v. Witkovich, O.T.1956, No. 295, pp. 8-9. Consequently, for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts, we recognize that period. After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the "reasonably foreseeable future" conversely would have to shrink. This 6-month presumption, of course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Read Full Text (off-site in new window) | Back to Top